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Abstract. In this paper we analyze four national elections held in 1982, 1986, 1989 and 1994
in the Netherlands on the occurrence of the Condorcet paradox. In addition, we investigate
these elections on the occurrence of three so-called majority-plurality paradoxes. The first
paradox states that a party having a majority over another party may receive less seats. The
second states that a Condorcet winner may not receive the largest number of seats and even
may not receive a seat at all. The third says that the majority relation may be the reverse of the
ranking of parties in terms of numbers of seats.
1. Introduction
The Condorcet paradox is concerned with voting situations in which no ma-
jority winner exists, in spite of the fact that voters have consistent preferences.
The paradox was discovered in the eighteenth century by the French philoso-
pher and mathematician Marquis de Condorcet (1743–1794). To illustrate the
paradox, we present an example constructed by Condorcet (1789). The voting
situation concerns sixty voters and three candidates called Pierre, Paul and
Jacques. The distribution of the voters is as follows:
23 voters: Pierre Paul Jacques
2 voters: Paul Pierre Jacques
17 voters: Paul Jacques Pierre
10 voters; Jacques Pierre Paul
8 voters: Jacques Paul Pierre
The voter preferences are supposed to be transitive. Thus a voter with for
instance the preference (Pierre, Paul, Jacques) prefers Pierre to Paul, Paul
to Jacques and, because of transitivity, Pierre to Jacques. According to this
preference profile, Pierre has a 33 to 27 majority over Paul, Jacques has a
35 to 25 majority over Pierre and Paul has a 42 to 18 majority over Jacques.
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Hence there is no candidate with a majority over every other candidate; there
is no majority winner or Condorcet winner.
Condorcet also compared the majority rule with other voting rules, in
particular the plurality rule. As is well known, the plurality rule selects the
candidate with the highest number of first places in the voter preferences.
Thus for the example above, this rule would have selected Pierre as the plu-
rality winner, in spite of the fact that a majority of voters prefers Jacques to
Pierre. Condorcet (1785, 1789) also discovered that a plurality winner and a
Condorcet winner may differ. Moreover, he came to the general conclusion
that different voting rules may yield different outcomes for the same voting
situation. Though this insight seems trivial by now, it is in fact at the heart of
a controversy between liberalism and populism (or, better, majoritarianism)
in the theory of democracy. See, e.g., Riker (1982) and Tännsjö (1992).
Clearly, if the Condorcet paradox occurs, then either no winner can be
selected when the majority rule is used or a minority candidate is selected in
the case of another rule, for instance the plurality rule. Thus in the case of
a paradox, the plurality rule selects a candidate that can be beaten by a ma-
jority. If instances of the paradox frequently occur, then either many decision
deadlocks can be observed in the case of the majority rule or many minority
candidates will be selected in the case of the plurality rule. Therefore, the
question of how frequently the Condorcet paradox occurs is important.
In this paper we investigate four Dutch elections on the occurrence of the
Condorcet paradox. The elections were held in 1982, 1986, 1989 and 1994.
The party preferences of the voters in these elections are constructed by using
data of the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies. We also investigate the oc-
currence of other paradoxes related to the plurality rule and the majority rule.
These so-called majority-plurality paradoxes are presented in Van Deemen
(1993). The first paradox of this kind occurs when a party is preferred by a
majority of the electorate to another party and yet receives less seats than that
other party. The second paradox occurs when a Condorcet winner does not
receive the largest number of seats. In fact, it is even theoretically possible
in list systems of proportional representation like the one used in the Nether-
lands that the Condorcet winner receives no seats at all. Also this possibility
will be investigated. Finally, the third majority-plurality paradox occurs when
the ranking of parties in accordance with the vote or seat distribution is the
reverse of the ranking of parties as obtained by the majority rule.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shortly reviews existing re-
search results concerning the relevance of the Condorcet paradox. In Section
3, the concept of election matrix is introduced and discussed. An election
matrix is a suitable tool for the empirical representation of voter preferences
in elections. Of course, we show how to detect a Condorcet paradox from an
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election matrix. Section 4 presents the election matrices of the Dutch elec-
tions held in 1982, 1986, 1989 and 1994. Further we investigate the matrices
on the occurrence of the Condorcet paradox and majority cycles. In the subse-
quent section, we investigate the data on the occurrence of majority-plurality
paradoxes. The final section contains conclusions and discusses future re-
search.
2. The relevance of the Condorcet paradox
After a long period of slumbering existence, the interest in the Condorcet
paradox was raised again by Arrow (1963) and Black (1958). Their rediscov-
ery of the paradox has led to two important research fields in public choice.
In the first, conditions are formulated that require voter preferences to satisfy
certain regularities in such a way that the paradox is avoided. So the aim of
this research is to find conditions that forbid the occurrence of the paradox.
The most-known condition in this respect is single-peakedness formulated
by Black (1958). This condition requires that alternatives (or motions as
Black called them) can be linearly ordered in such a way that the graph of
each voter preference has one and only one peak. Black was able to prove that
in case of single-peaked preferences the optimum of the median voter pref-
erence must be the majority winner when the number of voters is odd. This
result is called the Median Voter Theorem. Further he showed that single-
peakedness ensures the transitivity of majority decision-making in the case of
odd numbers of voters and its quasi-transitivity in the case of even numbers
of voters.
The second research field does not forbid the Condorcet paradox, but
instead tries to find out how often it will occur in real decision-making sit-
uations. This research line can be split up into two sub-fields. The task in
the first sub-field is to calculate the probability of the Condorcet paradox for
several numbers of voters and alternatives. The second line aims at detecting
empirically instances of the paradoxes. We discuss both sub-fields.
The probability approach was initiated, again, by Black (1958). He arrived
at a probability of .0556 for the paradox in the case of three voters and three
alternatives and given the fact that voter preferences are linear orderings (i.e.,
rankings without ties). He was not able to give further calculations but he
conjectured that the probability of the paradox “increases rapidly with an
increase in the number of motions” (Black 1958: 51). Since Black, several
researchers have calculated the probabilities of the Condorcet paradox by
means of computer simulations (Campbell and Tullock, 1965; Klahr, 1966)
as well as by means of analytical expressions (DeMeyer and Plott, 1970;
May, 1971; Niemi and Weisberg, 1968; Garman and Kamien, 1968; Gehrlein
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Table 1. Probabilities of no Condorcet-winners for Dutch elec-
tions (1982–1994)
Election year Number of parties Probability of
no Condorcet-winner
1982 13 .56869
1986 12 .54706
1989 9 .45453
1994 9 .45453
Source: Gehrlein (1983); Gehrlein & Fishburn (1976).
and Fishburn, 1976; Gehrlein, 1983). The general conclusion to be drawn
from the calculations is that, indeed, the probabilities rapidly increase with
an increasing number of voters but this increase is less than in the case of a
growing number of alternatives.
To find the probabilities for the four Dutch elections under scrutiny, we
suppose that the size of the electorate approaches infinity so that we can use
the limit values for the several numbers of parties as calculated in the studies
mentioned above. The probabilities for the elections are given in Table 1.
However, the results in this table should be interpreted with care. First, the
calculations are based on the assumption of equally likely voter preferences.
This assumption, which is called Impartial Culture, is highly implausible.
Studies in which the probabilities of the paradox under alternative cultures
or distribution assumptions are calculated, are scarce. In addition, the limit
values under different cultures are still unknown.
The second reason to be careful is that most of the calculations start from
the assumption that voter preferences are linear orderings, i.e., rankings with-
out ties. This is not a realistic approach. As we shall see, we found many
ties in the voter preferences in the four Dutch elections under scrutiny. Also
see Niemi (1970). Recently, Jones, Radcliff, Taber, and Timpone (1995) cal-
culated the probability of the paradox for weak orderings, thus for rankings
with ties. However, they did not provide limit values for several numbers of
alternatives so that their results cannot be used for national elections. Further
they defined the paradox as the absence of a unique Condorcet winner. Now
it is clear that in the case of weak orderings, two or more Condorcet winners
may exist. In this work, we retain the definition of the paradox as the absence
of a Condorcet winner and not as the absence of a unique one. So, situations
with two or more Condorcet winners will not be considered as paradoxes.
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The second field in this research tradition is directed at finding empirical
instances of the paradox. This research was initiated by Riker (1965), who
found a paradox in the U.S. senate in 1911 and a paradox in the House of
Representatives in 1956. It is useful here to make a distinction between voting
in committees and voting in large elections. Since Riker’s study, a number
of other empirical instances of the paradox have been found in committee
voting situations. Blydenburgh (1971) found two Condorcet paradoxes in the
U.S. House of Representatives in 1932 and 1938. Jamison (1975), using ex-
perimental data about preferences in small groups, also detected a Condorcet
paradox. More recently, Vergunst (1996) found a Condorcet paradox in a case
treated in the Second Chamber of the Dutch parliament in 1994. In contrast to
these results, instances of the paradox in large elections are difficult to detect.
This is remarkable, since probability calculations indicate that the paradox
should occur far more frequently in large elections than in comparatively
small committees. So, Chamberlin, Cohen, and Coombs (1984) did not find a
paradox in the case of elections for the American Psychological Association.
Similarly, Niemi and Wright (1987) did not find a paradox in the Presidential
Elections of 1980. Feld and Grofman (1992) investigated preference data of
36 elections held in professional organizations, unions and non-profit organi-
zations. They did not find a Condorcet paradox either. Finally, Radcliff (1994)
investigated president elections in the U.S. Neither he was able to detect the
paradox. The only and so far unique exception is Niemi (1970), who discov-
ered a paradox in a case of university elections. In this paper we search for
Condorcet paradoxes in four national elections held in the Netherlands. Basic
in our detection method is the concept of an election matrix.
3. Election matrices
Election matrices provide a powerful tool for analyzing election data. In par-
ticular, it is a convenient device for detecting paradoxes of voting. Let the
number of voters who strictly prefer xi to xj be denoted by N(xi,Pxj) and let m
be the number of alternatives. An election matrix is defined as a square matrix
E = ((eij)), where eij = N(xiPxj) for each i,j = 1,2,...,m and i 6D j, and where eii
= 0 for i = 1,2,...,m. Thus each cell ((eij)) in an election matrix contains the
number of voters who strictly prefer alternative xi to alternative xj.
The matrix (1/n).E denotes the proportional election matrix. A cell ((xi,
xj)) in this matrix contains the proportion of voters strictly preferring xi to
xj. Let E0 denote the transpose of E. Clearly, the matrix S = E – E0 is skew-
symmetric, that is, ((sij)) = ((–sji)) for i, j = 1,2,...,m. The entries in S show the
margins of the voters for an alternative over another alternative. If the margin
is non-negative, then that alternative is preferred by a majority to the other
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alternative. It is negative if the other alternative is strictly majority-preferred.
Clearly, if a row contains only non-negative numbers, the alternative rep-
resented by the row is a Condorcet winner. Thus the matrix S provides an
easy method for detecting Condorcet paradoxes: look for rows with only
non-negative numbers. If there are none, the paradox has occurred.
4. Empirical evidence in four Dutch elections
In this paragraph we present and analyze the preference data concerning the
four national elections of 1982, 1986, 1989 and 1994. First, the nature of the
preference data will be explained. In order to illustrate our working proce-
dure, we then present and analyze the election matrix of 1994 obtained from
these data. Finally, the full majority relation for each of the elections of 1982,
1986, 1989 and 1994 is produced and analyzed. Of course, the data will be
investigated on the occurrence of the Condorcet paradox.
The data are taken from the Dutch parliamentary election study (NKO) of
1982, 1986, 1989 and 1994. In the period before and after each election of
the Dutch parliament, about 1500 respondents are interviewed about a wide
range of issues. One of the many questions concerns the probability that a
respondent will ever vote for a party. Each respondent can choose a point on
a scale from 1 (“certainly never”) through 10 (“some time certainly”). We
will use the probability votes obtained in this way for the construction of
the voters’ party preferences. We assume that if a voter gives more points to
party x than to party y, she strictly prefers x to y. Notation: pi(x) > pi(y)$
xPiy, where pi(x) stands for the probability future vote score of respondent
i for party x and where P stands for strict preference. Furthermore, p(x) =
p(y) for a voter means that this voter is indifferent with respect to parties x
and y; notation: xIy. The voter preferences constructed in this way are then
aggregated by the majority rule. According to this aggregation procedure,
party x is majority-preferred to party y if the number of voters who strictly
prefer x to y is at least as large as the number of voters who prefer y to
x; notation: xMy $ N(xPiy)  N(yPix). In this case, we say that party x
has a majority over party y. The binary relation M thus obtained over all
pairs of parties is called the majority relation. Notice that according to this
definition, indifference does not affect the majority relation between parties.
In this context, a Condorcet winner is a party having a majority over every
other party. In other words, x is a Condorcet winner if xMy for all parties y.
Table 2 contains the election matrix obtained from the individual scores
collected in the Dutch national election in 1994. For example, the cell (D66,
PvdA) in this matrix contains the number of 655 while the cell (PvdA, D66)
contains the number of 580. This means that 655 respondents strictly prefer
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Table 2. Majority scores for the 1994 elections in the Netherlands: N(xPiy)
Party D66 PvdA CDA VVD Groen RPF SGP GPV CD
Links
D66 0 655 818 753 988 995 1036 1026 1262
PvdA 580 0 715 767 905 914 946 946 1183
CDA 480 608 0 607 779 901 930 937 1151
VVD 471 540 594 0 783 847 883 885 1137
GroenLinks 208 300 508 505 0 723 743 743 996
RPF 152 191 99 160 240 0 114 94 545
SGP 136 194 89 154 237 107 0 95 573
GPV 146 191 92 153 238 74 79 0 562
CD 50 81 61 51 87 56 59 61 0
Source: Dutch Parliamentary Election Study (n = 1527).
D66 to PvdA and that 580 strictly prefer the PvdA. Since the total number of
respondents is 1527, we conclude that 292 of the respondents are indifferent
or have not given a future probability score for at least one of the two par-
ties. (This means that the numbers of respondents are not the same for each
pair.) The matrices for the elections of 1982, 1986, and 1989 are given in the
Appendix.
The skew-symmetric election matrix for 1994 is the matrix difference
between the election matrix and its transpose. It is given in Table 3. In this ma-
trix, the first row contains only non-negative numbers. Therefore we conclude
that the corresponding political party D66 is the Condorcet winner. Hence, the
Condorcet paradox did not occur in this national election. Proceeding in the
same way for the elections of 1982, 1986, and 1989, we arrive at the conclu-
sion that no Condorcet paradox did occur in any of these elections. Notice
that this does not mean that the concerned majority relations are acyclical. A
Condorcet winner may beat any other party involved in a cycle, as long as
this winner itself is not involved in a cycle. In other words, the existence of a
Condorcet winner only implies that there is no top-cycle.
To detect majority cycles, we need the majority relation for each election.
Such a relation can be constructed by means of the skew-symmetric election
matrices by using the fact that a non-negative number in such a matrix implies
the row party to have a majority over the column party. Proceeding in this way
we arrive at the following majority relations for the concerned elections (see
Table 4).
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Table 3. Skew-symmetric election matrix 1994
Party D66 PvdA CDA VVD GRLNKS RPF SGP GPV CD
D66 0 75 338 282 780 843 900 880 1212
PvdA –75 0 107 227 605 723 752 755 1101
CDA –338 –107 0 13 271 802 841 845 1090
VVD –282 –227 –13 0 278 687 729 732 1086
GRLNKS –780 –605 –271 –278 0 483 506 505 909
RPF –843 –723 –802 –687 –483 0 7 20 489
SGP –900 –752 –841 –729 –506 –7 0 16 514
GPV –880 –755 –845 –732 –505 –20 –16 0 501
CD –1212 –1102 –1090 –1086 –909 –489 –514 –501 0
Table 4. Social rankings based on the majority rule and on the election results of the Dutch parliament,
1982-86-89-94
1982 1986 1989 1994
Ranking MR PR MR PR MR PR MR PR
1 CDA PvdA CDA CDA CDA CDA D66 PvdA
2 VVD CDA PvdA PvdA PvdA PvdA PvdA CDA
3 PvdA VVD D66 VVD D66 VVD CDA VVD
4 D66 D66 VVD D66 VVD D66 VVD D66
5 DS70 PSP PPR SGP GRLNKS GRLNKS GRLNKS GRLNKS
6 PPR SGP PSP PPR SGP SGP RPF CD
7 PSP CPN CPN PSP GPV GPV SGP RPF
8 SGP PPR SGP GPV RPF RPF GPV SGP
9 CPN RPF GPV RPF CD CD CD GPV
10 GPV CP EVP CPN
11 RPF GPV RPF CP
12 CP DS70 CP EVP
13 BP BP
MR: Majority Relation.
PR: Proportional Representation Ranking; ranking according to the proportions of votes in the
elections.
483
Table 4 also gives the rankings of the parties as yielded by the Dutch
system of proportional representation. In the next section, we will use this
information for detecting the majority-plurality paradoxes mentioned in the
introduction. In addition, we note that the majorities in all the four majority
relations are strict.
The results are surprising indeed. The majority relations are all transitive;
none of them contains a cycle. So not only top cycles are absent, but any
majority cycle whatsoever. What is the reason of “so much stability” (Tullock,
1981)? The research line on domain conditions as briefly discussed above
may provide an answer. It is possible that there is a underlying pattern that
restricts the voter preferences in such a way that the paradox cannot occur.
As we have seen, the best-known condition in this respect is Black’s condi-
tion of single-peaked preferences. We apply this to the Dutch situation in the
concerned elections.
Remember that voter preferences are single-peaked if there is a linear
ordering of parties such that, in passing from one party to the next in this
ordering, each voter preference shows only one top (or a plateau in the case of
indifferent preferences at the top). In the four Dutch elections under scrutiny
we could not find such a linear ordering. First we tried out, of course, the
traditional left-right dimension in Dutch politics. For example, using data
of the National Parliamentary Election Studies we arrived at the following
left-right ranking of the parties for 1994:
GroenLinks − PvdA− D66− CDA− VVD− SGP− GPV− RPF− CD
See also Vergunst (1995). For this linear ordering we found that only 35.1%
of the voter preferences were single-peaked. The other possible orderings of
parties did not work either, not only for this case but for every case we studied.
Our conclusions concerning the observed stability cased by preference
regularities are preliminary. As the above results show, single-peakedness of
voter preferences in Dutch elections is not a very likely cause. However, other
domain restrictions like Sen’s (1966) value restriction may be operational. In
order to be more conclusive, much more empirical research on preference
patterns and domain restrictions is needed.
5. Majority-plurality paradoxes in the four elections
The main goal of this paper is to analyze Dutch elections on the occurrence of
the Condorcet paradox. In order to detect the paradoxes and, as a by-product,
possible majority cycles, the majority relation for each election under scrutiny
was reconstructed (see Table 4). These majority relations now will be used
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Table 5. Comparing rankings by
majority rule to rankings by
the proportional system in the
Netherlands (1982–1994)
Election year Kendall’s tau
1982 .6410
1986 .7576
1989 .9444
1994 .6667
Source: Rankings Table 4.
for detecting three possible majority-plurality paradoxes as discussed in the
introduction.
The three paradoxes are:
1. The More-Preferred-Less-Seats Paradox, which states that a party having
a majority over another party may receive less seats;
2. The Condorcet-Winner-Turns-Loser Paradox, which states that a Con-
dorcet winner need not receive the largest number of seats and even may
not receive a seat at all, and;
3. The Majority-Reversal Paradox, which states that the majority relation
for an election may be the reversal of the ranking of the parties in cor-
respondence with their number of seats as assigned by the system of
proportional representation.
It can be shown that each of these paradoxes may occur in the Dutch system
of proportional representation (Van Deemen, 1993). However, do they occur
in reality? Table 4 contains, besides the majority relations in the left part of
each column (called MR), the rankings in terms of the number of seats as
actually assigned to the parties by the system of proportional representation.
See the right part of each column (called PR) in Table 4. A first look at this
table immediately shows the differences between the two rankings MR and
PR. For the elections of 1982, 1986 and 1994, the More-Preferred-Less-Seats
Paradox occurs abundantly. It also occurs in 1989, but to a less extent. In that
year, there was only one pair of parties with reversed positions, namely VVD
and D66.
To gain more insight into the coherence of both relations for each elec-
tion, we calculated Kendall’s tau (Table 5). Clearly, the smaller Kendall’s tau,
the more majority-plurality reversals can be observed. We conclude that the
election of 1982 contains the most reversals.
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The Condorcet-Winner-Turns-Loser Paradox occurred twice. In 1994, D66
was the majority winner, but PvdA received the largest number of seats. Also
CDA and VVD received more seats than D66, in spite of the fact that D66 had
a majority over both parties. The second case occurred in 1982 when CDA
received more seats than the majority winner PvdA. We did not observe the
fact that a Condorcet winner may not receive a seat at all.
The Majority-Reversal Paradox did not occur in any of the four elections.
Although the rankings based on the majority rule can be quite different from
the rankings based on the system of proportional representation, there is no
election year in which the majority ranking is completely reversed.
6. Conclusions
Voting in accordance with the majority rule is often considered as a necessary
condition for real democracy (Dahl, 1989). The major problem of the major-
ity rule, however, is the possibility of cycles that prevent the existence of a
Condorcet winner. If this is the case, we speak of the Condorcet paradox. In
this paper we tried to find instances of the Condorcet paradox in four national
elections held in 1982, 1986, 1989 and 1994 in the Netherlands. We did not
find the paradox. The majority relation for every election appeared to be fully
transitive.
This result is in line with previous research on cycles in large elections.
For some reason or another, cycles in large elections are scarce. Now it is
well-known from theoretical studies that regularities in voter preferences may
prevent the occurrence of the paradoxes. Single-peaked preferences consti-
tute the most clear example of this. However, we did not find evidence for
single-peakedness in the four elections investigated by us. But of course,
other preference regularities we did not investigate yet, may be operational. In
order to reveal the real causes of the absence of Condorcet paradoxes, much
empirical research has to be done.
We also tried to detect instances of majority-plurality paradoxes. Two of
the three paradoxes formulated by us actually did occur. First, we found many
instances of the paradox that a party having a majority over another party
received less seats than that other party. A good indication for this paradox is
Kendall’s tau. Especially the elections of 1982 and 1994 are characterized by
a small Kendall’s tau and hence by a high number of reversals. Further, we
found two instances of the paradox that a Condorcet winner does not receive
the largest number of seats. In the election of 1994, three parties received
more seats than the Condorcet winner and in the election of 1982 only one.
We did not find instances of the paradox that the majority relation over the
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parties is the complete reverse of the ranking of the parties as yielded by
proportional representation.
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A
ppendix
Table App. 1. Majority scores for the 1982 elections in the Netherlands: N(xPiy)
Party CDA VVD PvdA D66 DS70 PPR PSP SGP CPN GPV RPF BP CP
CDA 0 486 583 600 634 675 702 727 760 743 733 778 788
VVD 351 0 513 528 596 607 633 656 690 672 659 715 720
PvdA 460 473 0 480 544 551 597 615 665 636 634 661 671
D66 320 303 364 0 498 508 581 593 637 614 599 648 660
DS70 110 105 194 140 0 251 303 306 346 329 326 376 397
PPR 232 239 116 180 242 0 276 342 348 354 356 384 408
PSP 189 191 85 144 192 115 0 249 254 272 267 299 321
SGP 44 78 130 100 106 143 161 0 195 108 123 196 228
CPN 154 156 50 117 153 79 93 194 0 209 207 222 226
GPV 44 74 129 95 108 138 152 77 191 0 92 171 218
RPF 47 73 119 88 102 125 139 83 171 76 0 161 194
BP 20 27 62 40 44 73 75 50 103 46 55 0 110
CP 21 18 37 35 35 45 45 43 53 45 40 40 0
Source: Dutch Parliamentary Election Panel Study 1981–86 (n = 1206).
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Table App. 2. Majority scores for the 1986 elections in the Netherlands N(xPiy)
Party CDA PvdA D66 VVD PPR PSP CPN SGP GPV EVP RPF CP
CDA 0 645 624 668 762 800 844 855 860 848 846 944
PvdA 575 0 536 672 727 760 805 756 769 794 772 875
D66 456 472 0 565 706 757 825 804 815 830 821 930
VVD 286 471 403 0 590 622 661 634 642 653 646 759
PPR 301 168 162 355 0 349 445 445 467 477 474 588
PSP 234 120 154 283 152 0 329 314 333 334 334 467
CPN 212 90 122 254 109 146 0 265 281 275 367 367
SGP 56 174 109 121 179 177 247 0 133 201 148 328
GPV 53 171 106 113 163 163 224 77 0 164 100 314
EVP 85 114 86 145 121 133 206 163 155 0 160 330
RPF 53 141 86 100 132 137 196 77 55 139 0 285
CP 11 28 17 14 20 21 25 23 21 23 21 0
Source: Dutch Parliamentary Election Study 1986 (n = 1356).
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Table App. 3. Majority scores for the 1989 elections in the Netherlands: N(xPiy)
Party CDA PvdA D66 VVD GRLNKS SGP GPV RPF CD
CDA 0 728 698 807 889 990 989 975 1113
PvdA 637 0 613 763 845 925 931 931 1074
D66 581 573 0 737 873 1002 1006 1008 1146
VVD 335 472 435 0 646 761 759 762 912
GRLNKS 365 226 229 498 0 646 646 651 806
SGP 90 187 152 186 214 0 154 181 443
GPV 88 204 154 195 226 151 0 149 443
RPF 80 180 137 169 201 125 72 0 408
CD 43 48 47 43 67 61 62 62 0
Source: Dutch Parliamentary Elections Study 1989 (n = 1506).
